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Abstract
Multi-attribute resource allocation problems involves the allocation of re-
sources on the basis of several attributes, therefore, the definition of a fair-
ness method for this kind of auctions should be formulated from a multi-
dimensional perspective. Under such point of view, fairness should take into
account all the attributes involved in the allocation problem, since focus-
ing in just a single attribute may compromise the allocations regarding the
remainder attributes (e.g. incurring in delayed or bad quality tasks). In
this paper, we present a multi-dimensional fairness approach based on prior-
ities. For that purpose, a recurrent auction scenario is assumed, in which the
auctioneer keeps track on winner and losers. From that information, the pri-
ority methods are defined based on the lost auctions number, the number of
consecutive losing, and the fitness of their loser bids. Moreover, some meth-
ods contain a probabilistic parameter that enables handling wealth ranking
disorders due to fairness. We test our approach in real-data based simula-
tor which emulates an industrial production environment where several re-
source providers compete to perform different tasks. The results pointed that
multi-dimensional fairness incentives agents to remain in the market whilst
it improves the equity of the wealth distribution without compromising the
quality of the allocation attributes.
Keywords: Multi-attribute resource allocation, Multi-agent systems,
Fairness, Auctions
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1. Introduction
Auction mechanisms offer the possibility to allocate resources and ser-
vices in a market (e.g. a company which desires to externalize a production
task) while optimizing the outcome of all of the participants (bidders and
auctioneers). Thus, given a production task, resource providers bid for it,
and the winner bid is the one that best fits the required resource specifica-
tions. The auction ends when the winner bid receive’s the payment from the
auctioener.
The auction designer’s goals include optimizing the payoff or revenue of
bidders and auctioneers, so that all the participating agents are gratified
and keep in the market place. To evaluate how the bidders are satisfied
with the auction outcome, as well as the revenue obtained by the auctioneer
[3, 7] social welfare measures can be defined. The utilitarian view of social
welfare has been the main followed approach, and consist on aggregating all
of the agents’ outcomes towards maximizing their payoff or revenue. In this
utilitarian approach, the aggregation does not consider the fact that there
could be big differences among agents’payoffs. When auctions are repeated
over time (recurrent auctions), this situation may lead to the unsatisfaction of
certain participants which eventually may decide to leave the market. When
this occurs, only the most powerful bidders remain in the market, gaining
the chance to create an oligopoly, control the market price and provoking a
general fall of prices which can bankrupt the auctioneers. Literature often
refers to these situations as the bidder drop problem [11] and the asymmetric
balance of negotiation power [18].
To tackle these problems, fairness measures have been used in auction
design, in what is known as egalitarian social welfare approaches. In this
scenario, the behavior of bidders can be totally selfish as it is the auctioneer
agent who uses fairness measures to distribute the revenues to keep bidders
interested in participating and, therefore, reducing the bidder drop problem.
At the end, more bidders mean a higher competition among them, leading
the market to more competitive prices. Our work concerns recurrent auction
mechanisms with a fairness functionality handled by the auctioneer in order
to maintain its own revenue in the long run.
Particularly, we focus in the use of auctions for allocating resources to
services where prices are one among other relevant aspects to take into ac-
count when clearing the auction. Attributes such as service time, distance
among providers, ecological footprint, etc. can play an important part in the
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process of the determining which suppliers best suits the production needs.
Therefore, it is important to find a compromise between all the elements
that condition the resources in order to obtain a satisfying allocation. Multi-
attribute auctions offer the chance to consider different aspects besides the
price, becoming an ideal option for the problem we are dealing with. Con-
sistently fairness cannot be limited to the payoffs and revenues obtained by
agents due to the fact that focusing the application of fairness in a single
attribute (price) may involve undesirable consequences regarding the rest of
attributes (e.g. unbalance workloads or produce delays). To prevent this
issues, we propose to apply fairness mechanisms considering not only the
economic aspects of the auction but also the remaining attributes involved
in the resource allocation decision making process, in what we called the
multidimensional fairness.
In this work, we explore a multidimensional fairness mechanism based
on priorities in order to increase the social welfare resulting from a large
sequence of auction allocations. Priorities are computed using information
regarding all the attributes involved in the resource allocation process, avoid-
ing unwanted behaviors, as for example, the situation in which the auctioner
achieves a cheap price but a large delay on performing some tasks, as other
fairness mechanisms based exclusively on price could exhibit. We present a
collection of different priority methods for including multi-dimensional fair-
ness to a multi-attribute auction mechanism: two qualitative and two quan-
titative approaches with a deterministic version and an stochastic version
of each one. To illustrate and test the auction mechanism, we simulate an
industrial environment where different agents auction services which must be
carried out by external service providers while trying to obtain a service in
a reasonable price and time.
This paper is organized as follow: first we present a brief state of the
art regarding multi-attribute auctions and fairness in auctions; second, in
Section 3 we introduce some basic concepts regarding auctions and multi-
attribute auctions; next, in section 4 we propose to endow the auction mech-
anism with multidimensional fairness by means of priority-based methods;
in Section 5.2 we test the approach proposed in a task allocation simulator
in order to analyze how it affects the social welfare of the allocations and,
finally, in Section 6 we present the conclusions of our work and we point some
possible future lines of research.
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2. Related work
Despite it has been proven that preserving the number of participants
in an auction increases its efficiency in the mid and long term [16] and that
evaluating fairness from a multi-dimensional point of view can lead to a higher
customer satisfaction, few research has been done in the field of fairness in
recurrent auctions. From the best of our knowledge, there are no previous
auction approaches dealing with fairness from a multidimensional point of
view; however, there are some previous works involving a single factor, the
price, conditioning fairness. In [11], the authors improve the welfare of the
weakest agents by establishing a reservation price so that some goods cannot
be sold if the prices offered by bidders are under this reservation price. The
remaining goods are then distributed along the weakest agents. Regarding
the implications of fairness in the resulting allocations, in [12] the authors
make a comparison between fairness and efficiency concluding that there is
a compromise between both. However, Murillo et al. [16] claims that this
assertion may be true in the short-term but, if analyzing auction recurrence
in the long-term, fairness-based methods also become efficient as auctioneers
obtain as many benefits as with not fairness-based methods.
In [17], a first price single-dimension fair method based on priorities is
proposed. In it, the auctioneers assign a priority to each agent according to
its auction history. Bidders with a worst auction win record have a higher
priority, meaning that they have higher chances to win the next auction. The
authors propose to use the priority attribute to condition the auction clear-
ance by aggregating the priority to the bid, however, in the payment rule,
the priority attribute is omitted and does not conditions the payment the
winners receive. Although the authors prove that their approach solves the
bidder drop problem without incurring to a resource waste (leaving certain
goods without a buyer), the mechanism suffers from an asymmetric balance
of negotiation power [11, 16] caused by the lack of incentive compatibility
(the strongest winners obtain a higher utility by underbidding). Our pro-
posal, when using with a single dimension, can be compared to this previous
approaches. In addition to presenting a solution to the bidder drop prob-
lem without incurring to a waste of resources, as the previous approaches, it
reduces the asymmetric balance of negotiation power since using the prior-
ity attribute during the whole auction process (including the payment rule)
allows us to follow a second price philosophy which encourages bidders to
reveal their true values.
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3. Background
This section provides some basic notions regarding auctions and multi-
attribute auctions.
3.1. Auctions
An auction is a method for buying and selling goods using a bid system
in which the winner bids obtain the auctioned goods [10]. When auctions
are used to allocate resources or tasks, the mechanism commonly follows a
reverse auction structure (the auctioneer is the seller and bidders are the
buyers), which is the approach followed in this paper, and consists in the
following steps:
1. Request for proposals: The auctioneer defines the item which is going
to be auctioned (e.g. a task) and notifies the bidders.
2. Bidding: Bidders analyze the call for proposal and decide if they are
interested in entering the auction. If so, they submit a bid Bi with
their offer.
3. Winning determination problem (WDP): The auctioneer evaluates the
bids. As this is a reverse auction, the cheapest one is considered the
winner.
4. Payment mechanism: The auctioneer pays the winning bidder an amount
that would depend on all of the received bids, depending on the pay-
ment rule (e.g. in a second price or Vickrey auction, it would pay the
price offered by the second best bid [25]).
In recurrent auctions this process is repeated over time for each task or
resource to be allocated. Be aware, that repetition does not mean that the
same task is repeated over time, but a set of tasks, with different arrival times
and resources demands. Repetition could be due, for example, to the just in
time nature of manufacturing processes, when tasks arrives in an expected
distribution time, but the actual arrival times are unknown.
A desirable property that an auction mechanism should provide is to
ensure that bidders provide truthful bids (incentive compatible mechanism);
which means that bidders obtain a better profit by revealing their real offer
(true values) than by cheating. The most popular mechanism that guarantees
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true bidding is the Vickrey auction [14], a second price sealed bid auction
where the winner of the auction is the bid with the best offer and where it
pays (receive in reverse auctions) the amount proposed by the second best
bid.
On the other hand, a common assumption in auctions is the absence of
externalities, which means agents do not take care of which are the other
agents winning the auction and that agents are not influenced by aspects
from outside the current auction [4]. We are making this assumption in our
work, too.
Regarding the winner determination problem, it involves the use of a
valuation function on bids, V (Bi), so that the auctioneer can select the best
bid according to it. In the case of a reverse auction, the auctioneer is faced
then to the following problem:
argmini(V (Bi)) (1)
In the simplest auction mechanism, bids consist on the price bi (i.e. Bi = bi),
and the valuation function is the value of the price V (Bi) = bi. When the
bid contains other information than prices, the auctions are known to be
multi-attribute [20] and the winner determination problem becomes much
more complex.
3.2. Multi-attribute auctions
In multi-attribute auctions each bid is characterized by a set of attributes
in addition to price (e.g. the auctioneer can take into account other aspects
such as delivery times or CO2 emissions). Therefore, the winner determi-
nation problem consists on finding the optimal bid regarding price but also
the remainder attributes. Since the results depend on the auctioneer’s goal,
its objective optimization function, also known as scoring rule [1], is made
available to the bidders. Whenever the scoring rule coincides or not with
evaluation function V (Bi) would depend on the auctioneers strategy [19].
From the optimization point of view, equation 3.1 require a more complex
solution such as certain multicriteria methods [13, 21]. Moreover, multi-
attribute auctions make the payment method more difficult; e.g. in a second-
price auctions like the Vickrey one, the winner gets the good and pays the
price of the second best. However, when several attributes are involved in
the auction, the notion of second price is fuzzier [1]. A solution is to provide
a set of attributes in such a way that its valuation is not lower than the
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second best bid: e.g. keeping the bid attributes but modifying the economic
value in order to equal the second best bid. An example of a Vickrey-based
auction is VMA2 [22], as explained in Section4.
3.3. Position auctions
Multi-attribute auctions handles attributes regarding the task or item
auctioned, but other attributes can be considered in a valuation function, as
attributes provided by the auctioneers. This is the case of Google’s sponsored
search position auctions. In position auctions an auctioneer (e.g. a search
engine) auctions K slots to place an advertisement related to a given set of
keywords. Then, bidders participate in order to achieve one of those slots,
the auction is cleared by assigning the first slot to the best bid and the ith
slot to the ith best bid until there are no more available slots. The payment
is then done following a second price policy: the bidder which obtained the
k slot pays the price offered by the ith + 1 best bid.
In pay per click position auctions bidders offer the amount they aim to
pay each time their ad is clicked, in other words, they pay per click (ppc). In
this way, the bidder which will obtain the first slot will be the one with the
highest ppc, and the ith slot will go to the ith highest ppc bid. However, this
approach does not grant that the auctioneer utility will be maximized (e.g.
a bidder which offers a high ppc may have a bad reputation, not receiving
any click, thus the auctioneer would receive a payment of 0). To avoid that
revenue loss, Google and Yahoo propose to add an attribute at describing the
likelihood of an advertisement being clicked given the quality of its design
and the destination web page [24, 6]. This attribute is incorporated into the
auction by the auctioneer itself and it is aggregated with the ppc offered by
bidders. Thus, the winner of the first slot is the bid which offers the best
combination of ppc and at. The payment is then computed following a second
price, the price per click of the ith winner of the auction will correspond to
ppc it should have offered to equal the ith + 1 best bid.
It is important to note that the inclusion of this quality attribute does
not affect the bidding strategy of bidders. The only influence of quality over
bidders is that it encourages them to improve their ads and their web pages
in order to make them more attractive to the auctioneer so they can get a
higher quality valuation.
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4. Multidimensional fairness
Our goal is to define a fairness mechanism that considers different at-
tributes contributing in the decision of an auction-based resource allocation
process. In particular, we suppose an environment where a set of resource
agents compete for tasks that are repeated arbitrarily over time. Thus, the
auctioneer can keep track of the historical outcomes of each bidder on past
auctions, identify resources agents in risk of leaving the market, and making
fair decisions to keep agents interested in the market.
To achieve our goal, we propose to assign priorities to resource agents
according to their history in the resource allocation process (in a similar way
that is done in other allocation problems where competitors are rated based
in their past performances [2, 9]).
Prioritie are defined in wi ∈ [0, 1]. The higher is the ratio of lost auctions,
the higher is the priority of the bidder and its probabilities of leaving the
market. Consistently, priorities increase the chances of bidders of winning
one of the succeeding auctions.
Priorities can be handled as a bidder attribute in the auction model, simi-
lar to the click likelihood in the sponsored search position auctions. However,
position auctions only considers price to characterize tasks while we are deal-
ing with several task attributes (price, time to deliver, etc.). Therefore, we
use the VMA2 model that allows us to combine both, task attributes and
bidders attributes.
In a nutshell, when a task should be fulfilled, an auctioneer calls for
an auction, and all the interested bidders submit their bids Bi. Bids are
vectors composed by all the attributes characterizing the tasks, in addition
to price. Next, the auctioneer adds the priority attribute corresponding to
each bidder into their bids (B′i = Bi⊕〈wi〉). As any other attribute, priority
wi will condition the winner of the auction and its revenue inasmuch as wi
is taken into account both in the winner determination problem and in the
payment mechanism. Once the auction is finished, the auctioneer updates
the priorities of the participants according to the results of the auction.
Fairness at the global level, then, is not a matter of a single attribute, as
price or priority, but multidimensional as it comes from a set of all of the
attributes involved in the auction: the ones characterizing the task (price,
quality, delivery times, etc.) as well as the bidders (priority).
On defining the methods to compute the priority, one option is to di-
rectly relate the priority with the number of victories and defeats bidders
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Figure 1: Classification of the priority calculation methods analyzed in this section.
have obtained in the participated auctions. This method offers a quantita-
tive approach which just takes into account if a bidder has won or not. An
alternative is to combine the information regarding victories with the bids
offered by bidders and the valuation function used by the auctioneer. This
approach allows to evaluate the priority in a qualitative way since the bid
information can be used to determine how far from the victory a bid was,
giving a higher priority to the bidders which do not win but offer high ad-
justed bids. Finally, both the quantitative and qualitative method can be
also adapted under an stochastic model in order to deal with some possible
side effects of fairness.
In the remaining of the section, we first provide the fundamentals where
the priorities are defined and used, and then we describe the different methods
are explained grouped according to the classification provided in Figure 1:
quantitative, qualitative (or bid-based) and stochastic.
4.1. Underlying framework
In VMA2 [22] both, task attributes and bidder attributes are combined
in a single mechanism. The protocol is composed by the following steps:
1. Request for proposals: The auctioneer defines the tasks requirements
as time to deliver a tasks, minimum quality, etc.
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2. Bidding: Interested bidders provides bids Bi, composed by the price
bi and values for the requested attributes, at1, . . . , atn, such that Bi =
〈bi, at1, . . . , atn〉
3. The auctioneer receives the bids, and extends them with the bidder
priorities, B′i = Bi ⊕ 〈wi〉.
4. Winning determination problem (WDP): the auctioneer, selects the
best bid according to
argmini(V (B
′
i)) (2)
5. Payment mechanism: based on a second price schema, but with n
attributes in addition to price (see below).
6. Attribute update: The auctioneer updates the information it has con-
cerning the bidders. In this particular case, it computes the priority
corresponding to each bidder.
The valuation function could be a multicriteria function (see required
properties in [21]). For example, the product function could be used, so
when bids B′i contain information about task price bi and duration ti, and
bidder priority wi, we get
V (B′i) = bi ∗ ti ∗
1
1 + wi
(3)
Regarding the payment rule, it is a two case function. If the winner of
the auction delivers the task as agreed (e.g. it respects the delivery time and
the rest of bided attributes) it will receive the economical amount p it should
have bid to obtain the same evaluation as the second bid. Otherwise, if the
bidder cheats1 and does not delivers the task as it was bid (e.g. it delivers
the task to late or with different attributes than the agreed ones), it will
receive the economical amount p which equals the valuation of the offered
bid (with its original attributes and its economical bid) with the provided
1Other issues regarding uncertainty in the estimation of the bid attributes on behalf
of the bidder are out of the scope of this work, thus we consider that agents are able to
accurately estimate their attributes and it is assumed that if agents provide bids that are
not fulfilled it is because they cheat.
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task (with the delivered attributes). In other words, given the winner bid B′1
and the second best bid B′2 (i.e. in a reverse auction as ours, it means that
V (B′1) < V (B
′
2), and (V (B
′
2) < V (B
′
i)|∀i > 2), the winner bidder receives
and amount p equals to:
p =
{
V ′(V (B′2), B
′
1 \ {b1}) if receive attributes = bided attributes
V ′(V (B′1), B
r
1 \ {b1}) otherwise
(4)
where V ′(x,B′x \{bx}) = bx is the anti-function of V (B′x) regarding the price,
given V (B′x) = x (see proves and details in [22]); and B
r
1 is the bid vector
composed by the real attributes provided by the bidder and its priority.
4.2. Quantitative priority methods
Quantitative priority methods take into account the number of victories
and defeats achieved by each agent. Using this information the auctioneer
gives more priority to bidders with a high defeat record, reducing the risk of
these agents leaving the market. Two base methods have been defined: won
auction coefficient (WOC) and loosing streak (LS).
Timestamp 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bid Sequence - × × X × × X × ×
a1 WOC w1 0.00 0.50 0.6ˆ6 0.50 0.60 0.6ˆ6 0.57 0.63 0.6ˆ6
LS(8) w1 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.13 0.25
Bid Sequence - X X × × × × × ×
a2 WOC w2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.6ˆ6
LS(8) w2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.63 0.75
Bid Sequence - × × × X X × X ×
a3 WOC w3 0.00 0.50 0.6ˆ6 0.75 0.60 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.5ˆ5
LS(8) w3 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.375 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13
Bid Sequence - × × × × × × × X
a4 WOC w4 0.00 0.50 0.6ˆ6 0.75 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.88 0.7ˆ7
LS(8) w4 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.375 0.50 0.63 0.75 0.88 0.00
Table 1: Illustrative example of the auction record of three different agents and the priority
they would obtain when using the won auction coefficient and the losing streak (with a
ml of 8). X means that the bidder has won the auction whilst × means it has not.
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4.2.1. Won auction coefficient (WOC).
The won auction coefficient is the most intuitive way of computing the
priority of an agent, it establishes the ratio between the number of auctions
in which a bidder has participated (par(ai)) and the number of auctions in
which it has won (won(ai)), as shown in the following expression:
wi = 1− 1 + won(ai)
1 + par(ai)
(5)
This measure gives the auctioneer the notion of which has been the pro-
portion of won auctions for each bidder since the auctioneer entered the
auction market. Using this priority, a bidder which has won all the auctions
will have a priority of w = 0 while a bidder which has never won an auction
will have a priority close to 1.
To illustrate the behavior of WOC consider, for example, the sequence of
wins ( X) and defeats ( ×) obtained by a set of agents shown in Table 1.
The WOC method takes into account information regarding the whole
period where an auctioneer has been active, thus, in the long run the auc-
tioneer will tend to compensate the bidders which lost many times during
the first auctions and it will ballast which had won the most. On the one
hand, this means that if a bidder wins an auction after a large period of
defeats, its priority will remain high as it still has a low ratio of victories.
In the Table 1 example, a4 won the last auction but it still has the highest
WOC priority because it is the agent which have won less auctions. On the
other hand, a bidder experimenting a long losing streak will have a low pri-
ority if he obtained a high number of victories in the past. For instance, in
Table 1, a2 has a long losing streak but, at the end, it has the same priority
as a1 due to the fact that they both have won 2 auctions (a2 at the very
beginning, a1 in a more spaced way). To alleviate somehow such a situation,
a time window can be adopted (e.g. computing only the auctions summoned
during the last week); similarly, limiting the auction record which is taken
into account (e.g. computing only the last 100 auctions summoned by the
auctioneer) could smooth such compensation and ballast side effects of WOC
caused by its long term memory.
4.2.2. Loosing streak (LS).
Under certain circumstances, especially when some of the bidders are
directly controlled by human entities, certain bidders may experiment cogni-
tive distortions which can affect their reasoning [15]. E.g. a human-controlled
12
bidder might be more susceptible to leave the market after a succession of
two won auctions and 6 defeats (as agent a2 of Table 1 with a WOC of 0.6ˆ6)
than after a succession with the same amount of won auctions but where the
victories are more spread (e.g. the case of agent a1 with 2 defeats, 1 victory,
2d, 1v, 2d).
For this kind of scenarios the priority can be defined in the basis of the
bidders losing streak ls(ai) (the number of consecutive auctins which agent
ai has lost). The longer is the losing streak of an agent, the higher his
priority. For that purpose, we define a tolerance threshold ml such that after
losing a certain number of consecutive auctions as long as ml, a bidder is as
susceptible to leave the market as one which has lost ml + 1 auctions. Each
auctioneer fixes ml according to its believes about bidders behaviors. The
ideal strategy would be to assign an specific ml threshold for each bidder.
However since the auctioneer does not knows the different tolerances to the
losing streaks of the different bidders, it must estimate a generic ml which
will be the same for every bidder. Joreover, using a different ml for each
bidder leads to an unjust starting point as not all the bidders would be
treated under the same rules (e.g. if two agents exchange their bid sequences
they may obtain different results since they are participating under different
conditions). There fore, the same ml is assigned to each bidder.
We use this threshold to define the highest priority of the bidder as follows:
wi = 1− max(0,ml − ls(ai))
ml
(6)
where lsi is the losing streak of bidder ai. In this way, a bidder which has
just won an auction has a priority of w = 0 whilst a bidder which has been
ml auctions without winning has a priority of w = 1. Conversely to the
previous presented method, we can say that the LS method has no long term
memory as a bidder will see its priority reduced to 1 after winning an auction
independently to which has been his record of results in the past.
Following the example of Table 1, we can see how despite agent a1 and
a2 have the same number of victories and same priority when using WOC,
a2 has a higher priority when it is computed using LS due to the fact that it
has the highest losing streak.
4.3. Qualitative bid-based priorities
The above presented methods have an absolute behavior, since they treat
all non-winning bidders in the same way without taking into account the
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attribute values provided on their bids. In other words, the priority method
treats in the same way the bidder which almost won the auction (the second
best bid) and the bidder which offered the worst bid. On the one hand,
this situation may encourage some bidders to provide dummy bids with
no chances of winning in order to increase their priorities, obtaining higher
chances to win one of the following auctions. On the other hand, some bid-
ders offering almost-winning bids could feel frustrated when being aware that
attribute values of bids have no effect on the priority outcome. In order to
avoid that, we propose to take into account the attribute values of the offered
bid in the priority definition.
For that purpose, we define the fitness qi of a bid B
′
i in relation to the
winner bid of the auction B′1 depending on whether the aucction is reverse
(left) or not (right):
qi =
V (B′1)
V (B′i)
qi =
V (B′i)
V (B′1)
(7)
Following this definition we can say that the winner bid of the auction
has the maximum fitness q1 = 1 and that the higher qi is for a bid, the closer
it has been to win the auction. Taking bid fitness into account, we propose
to redefine the Won Auction Coefficient and the Loosing Streak priority
calculation methods presented above.
4.3.1. Bid-based won auction coefficient (BBWOC).
The priority is calculated in the same way that with the WOC method,
however, instead of taking into account the number of auctions in which an
agent has participated, it gathers the fitness of the bids it offered in the j
auctions where it has participated.
wi = 1− 1 + won(ai)
1 +
∑c−1
j=0 q
j
i
(8)
where qji is the fitness of the bid B
′
i in the j auction and c indicates the
current auction.
In this way, if there are two bidders which have won the same number
of auctions, the bidder which has been providing higher quality bidders will
be the one with the highest priority. This can be observed in the example
provided in Table 2 where bidders a2 and a3 have won the same number of
auctions, however, at the end, a2 has a higher priority (0.623) than a3 (0.549)
as a2 have been providing better bids.
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Timestamp 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bids valuation - 7 10 8 6 5 10 9 9
a1 Bid fitness q1 - 0.875 1.000 0.888ˆ 0.856 0.555ˆ 1.000 1.000 1.000
bbWOC w1 0.000 0.467 0.304 0.469 0.567 0.614 0.514 0.443 0.388
bbLS w1 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.111 0.218 0.288 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bids valuation - 7 8 9 5 9 9 8 7
a2 Bid fitness q2 A2 - 0.875 0.800 1.000 0.714 1.000 0.900 0.889 0.778
bbWOC w2 0.000 0.467 0.626 0.456 0.544 0.443 0.523 0.582 0.623
bbLS w2 0.000 0.109 0.209 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.113 0.224 0.321
Bids valuation - 8 5 7 7 7 6 5 4
a3 Bid fitness q3 - 1.000 0.500 0.778 1.000 0.778 0.600 0.556 0.444
bbWOC w3 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.390 0.299 0.407 0.470 0.517 0.549
bbLS w3 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.160 0.000 0.097 0.172 0.242 0.297
Table 2: Illustrative example of the auction record of three different agents, the valuation
received by their bids and the priority they would obtain when using the bid based won
auction coefficient and the bid based losing streak (with a ml of 8). Winning bids are
marked in bold.
4.3.2. Bid-based losing streak (BBLS).
The same can be done with the LS method. This method follows the
priority function in Equation 6; however, instead of using the losing streak
accumulated by bidders to define the priority, we propose to use the summa-
tion of the bid fitness obtained during the losing streak. In this way a long
streak of almost winning bids will increase the priority faster than a long
losing streak of low quality bids.
wi = 1−
max(0,ml −∑c−1j=c−ls(ai) qji )
ml
(9)
In Table 2 it can be seen how, despite a2 (3)has a shorter losing streak
than a3 (4), a2 ends with a higher priority (0.321 against 0.297) due the fact
that its bids have been closer to the victory than the ones bid by a3.
4.4. Stochastic priorities.
A problem that may arise due to priorities is the alteration of the agents
wealth ranking (see Section 5). E.g. the richest agent when not using the
fairness mechanism could become the second richest agent when priorities are
used. This problem can be minimized by updating the priority of the bidder
following stochastic or probabilistic methods, so somteimes the wealth rank is
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altered and some times it is not. In addition, a propbabilistic approach may
prevents agents from learning the priority mechanism. Thus, the step 6 of the
protocol is modified so the bidders priority is updated or not according to an
update priority probability parameter upj ∈ [0, 1] defined by the auctioneer
aj. The priority of the bidder’s can be computed using any of the previously
presented methods, the difference is that with this stochastic approach the
priority is not always updated.
In Algorithm 1 we present a stochastic algorithm which can use equations
5, 6, 8 and 9 as functions to calculate the priority of bidders. Dependending
on the equation choosen to determine the probability we can refer tot he
method as probWOC, probLS, probBBWOC or probBBLS.
Algorithm 1 Stochastic priority algorithm (auction step 6)
1: for all Bidder ai ∈ auction participants do
2: if Random(0, 1) < upj then
3: update aj.priority[ai]
4: else
5: aj.priority[ai] = aj.priority[ai]
6: end if
7: end for
Using a stochastic method bidders will not have the certainty of which is
their priority and they will not be able to take advantage of it. Moreover,
the use of an update probability can smooth the alteration of the wealth
ranking as it is reasonable to expect that a low update priority probability
will reduce the fairness of the final allocation but it will also reduce the wealth
ranking alteration. Therefore this approach rises the issue of finding a good
compromise between fairness and wealth ranking preservation.
5. Experimentation
To test and illustrate the behavior of the presented mechanism, we simu-
lated the processes and the services required by a company during a certain
time period.
5.1. Experimental set up
The problem domain used to analyze the properties of the presented
mechanism consists on the operation of an industry which needs to solve its
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Figure 2: Multi-agent System architecture for the simulation
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
RP1 X X X RP5 X X X
RP2 X X X X X X X RP6 X
RP3 X X X X RP7 X X X X X X X
RP4 X X X X X X X RP8 X X X X X X
Table 3: Capacity of a resource provider (RP) to develop a service (S).
customers’ issues (e.g. unforeseen faults, local system crashes, etc.). When a
customer informs about an incidence, a preliminary diagnosis process deter-
mines its urgency and its type, then a task is generated to solve the incidence,
which should be assigned to an external resource provider. The urgency pa-
rameter determines the maximum time in which each incidence must be
solved whilst the typology determines the kind of service which must attend
the issue, in consequence urgency and type determine the task configuration.
The data used to define the models for the simulation contains real infor-
mation regarding the incidences notified in a manufacturing company during
two years.2. In this data there are 7 different types of service (S1 to S7), 8
resource providers (RP1 to RP8) with differentiated skills as each resource
provider can perform only certain type of services (see Table 3). For each
type of service the occurrence probability distribution among a day has been
estimated from the data provided, such as to generate the task arrival times
2Due to confidentiality reasons, we cannot mention the name of the company.
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in the simulation environment following the same distribution pattern. The
same has been performed for the urgency parameter (to generate the tasks’
time window requirement) and for the task service durations of each resource
provider (each resource provider has different time distributions for each kind
of task).
To ensure the reproducibility of the experiments and to allow other re-
searches to test their approaches, an anonimized version of the data used and
the exact specifications of the distributions can be found in [23].
The simulation is built on the basis of a multi-agent system. Each kind of
service and each resource provider is managed by its own agent (See Figure 2).
Thus, there are two kinds of agents: service agents SA (which want to solve
an incident by performing some taks and need a resource in order to do
so) and resource providers RA (which can supply resources to carry out
tasks). Therefore, service agents play the role of auctioneers, while resources
providers the bidders ones. Overall, there are 15 agents (7 SA and 8 RA)
which compete to buy and to provide resources. All SA have the same
configuration regarding the priority methods (namely ml and upj). When
an SA needs to allocate a task to a resource, it summons an auction (defined
by the service type and the task execution time window) and all the resource
providers which can carry the required type of service offer their bids. Bids
are composed by two attributes: the bid amount bi corresponding to the
task’s cost and the task delivery time ti. The valuation function used during
the winner determination problem and the payment is the product, as shown
in Equation 3. The antifuction used to compute the payment is:
p =
{
(b2·t2)·(1+w1)
t1·(1+w2) if t
′ ≤ t1
(b1·t1)
t′ otherwise
(10)
where p is the payment the winner will receive, b1 the economic bid of the
winner bid, t1 the delivery time offered in the winner bid, b2 and t2 the
economic and delivery time attributes of the second best bid,t′ the final
delivery time the winner provides and w1 and w2 the priorities of the best
and the second best bids.
According to the goal of this simulation we propose the following three
studio scenarios:
• Scenario 1: The goal of this scenario is to show the differences between
multi-dimensional fairness and uni-dimensional fairness measures. The
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uni-dimensional fairness is based only on the price, as the previous
mechanisms in the literature. Particularly, we define the priority in
the uni-dimensional approach based on the price alone [16] (traditional
concept of ’revenue’) as follows:
wi = 1−
∑par(ai)
au=0 r
au
i∑l=n
l=0
∑au=par(al)
au=0 r
au
l
(11)
where raul is the revenue that the bidder l obtained in the auction au
and n the number of bidders in the market.
This priority relates the economic amount a bidder has won compared
to the total economic amount which has been paid by the auctioneer.
To complement the experiment, a mechanism without fairness (no pri-
ority) is also taken into account. Regarding the methods presented in
this paper, we test WOC, LS, BBWOC and BBLS, leaving the stochas-
tic approaches for another scenario. About the parameters required by
the priority methods, the values of ml in the LS and BBLS meth-
ods have been set to 70 (as in the simulation, in average, a resource
provider participates in 10 auctions per day and we considered that a
week without working is enough time for an agent to leave the market).
• Scenario 2: The goal of this experiment is to anlayze the role which
probability plays in the stochastic priority methods. Particularly, we
focus on the influence of the priority in the wealth ranking achieved by
agents. In this scenario the experiment is repeated several times with
different priority update probabilities upj, starting form upj = 0 and
increasing gradually by 0.1 until upj = 1. All SA have the same upj
value.
• Scenario 3: The aim of this scenario is to evaluate how the use of
priorities, defined in a multidimensional way, minimize the bidder drop
problem and other related problems. To this end, bidders are designed
in such a way that if after a certain number of auctions they have not
obtained benefits, they leave the auction market. All the bidders have
the same skills (RP6) and true values (55e per task, and the same
execution times) but follow different bidding strategies: half of them
are honest and adaptative, while the other half are cheaters.
To have enough kind of agents of both kinds, we have increased the
amount of bidder agents up to 50 with respect to the previous scenarios.
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Service Agents Resource Providers Bidders Strategy Priorities Used
(auctioneers) (bidders)
No priority, WOC,
Scenario 1 7 (S1 to S7) 8 (RP1 to RP8) Adaptative Uni-dimensional,
BBWOC, LS (ml=25),
BBLS (ml=25)
probWOC
Scenario 2 7 (S1 to S7) 8 (RP1 to RP8) Adaptative probBBWOC
probLS (ml=25),
probBBLS (ml=25)
25 Adaptative No Priority, WOC,
Scenario 3 10 (type S5) 50 (R6) (mcal = 50) BBWOC, probWOC,
25 Cheater LS (ml = 25),
(mcal = 100) BBLS (ml=25)
Table 4: Simulation parameters. Each scenario has a duration of 400 cycles (days) and
it is repeated 200 times (mcal = maximum consecutive auctions lost before leaving the
market)
On the one hand, 25 of them are follow an adaptive strategy to improve
their bids in order to win auctions [11]; they can stay up to 50 auctions
without obtaining benefits. On the other hand the cheater agents start
following an underbidding strategy (working below their true value cost
and affording economic losses for a while) in order to force the adaptive
agents to leave the market for creating an oligopoly where they can fix
the market price. Once this happens, they try to rise prices in order to
increase their benefits. In order to carry this strategy, cheating agents
can stay up to 100 auctions without obtaining benefits before leaving
the market. To feed the 50 bidders, there are 10 auctioneers which
only auction tasks of type S5 (Table 3). The experiment is performed
with no priority, WOC, BBWOC, probBBWOC (up=0.7), LS and the
BBLS.
Table 4 summarizes the parameter used in the different simulated scenar-
ios. The simulations last 400 cicles which correspond, approximately, to a
year of work in the industry and each experiment is repeated 200 times in
order to obtain significant data.
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5.2. Experimental results
This subsection presents and discusses the results of the proposed scenar-
ios. Results are measured in terms of:
• Price: To evaluate how the priorities affect the price, we compared the
revenue among bidders (the higher, the best),the auctioneers expendi-
ture (the lower the best) and the task allocation mean cost on behalf
of the auctioneer (the lower, the best).
• Delivery time: Particularly, since tasks are defined to be performed
inside a time window, we are interested on delays caused by tasks with
the aim to avoid or minimize them. A one dimensional fair mechanism
that does not take into account this attribute, but only the price, should
fail in reducing the delays; while a multi-dimensional fair mechanism as
the one presented here, should achieve better results (minimize delays).
• Fairness:
– The Gini’s index [8] is used to evalauate the fairness of the result-
ing allocations at the end of the simulation (the lower, the best).
Gini’s index is thought to analyze the social welfare differences
among populations, thus, we have adapted it to our domain. The
percentage of the population which corresponds to each resource
provider is determined using the number of types of task which
can perform each service agent. E.g. RP2 has a population of the
18.42% as it can perform 7 tasks out of 38, RP5 a population of
7.89% (3/38), etc.
– The agent’s wealth rank modification (WRM). We wanted to eval-
uate the influence of fairness by comparing the position of an agent
in the wealth rank when no fairness is used and when it is. For
that purpose, we use Spearman’s footrule [5] distance (SFD).
In this way, we define the WRM as the SFD between the original
wealth rank obtained when no priorities where used (Ro) and the
welth rank when fairness is used (Rf ) divided by the SFD between
the original wealth ran (Ro) and its reverse rank (Rr);
WRM =
sfd(Ro, Rf )
sfd(Ro, Rr)
(12)
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where sfd(X, Y ) is the spearman’s footrule between the ranks X
and Y and WRM ∈ [0, 1].
With this metric, a WRM of 0 means that the priority has not
altered the wealth ranking at all whilst a WRM of 1 means that
the wealth rank has been completely altered.
For instance, if we have three agents a, b, c which obtained a wealth
of 10,9 and 3 respectively when none priority was used and which
obtained a wealth of 8,9 and 5 when fairness is used we can see
that there has been 2 displacements in the wealth rank (b goes
from the second to the third whilst c varies from the third to the
second). Given that inverting the original wealth rank produces 4
displacements (a varies 2 positions by going from the first position
to the last and c 2 more positions from going from the last to the
first), the WRM is 0.5 (2/4) since there has been 2 displacements
out of 4 possibles.
– The number of agents which remain in the system is used to eval-
uate both fairness the bidder drop problem. In a fairer allocation
bidders will prefer to stay on the market, a higher number of bid-
ders reflects a fair allocation.
5.2.1. Results on scenario 1:
Figures 3 and 4 show the mean revenue and expenditure obtained by
agents during the simulations with the different mechanism considered in
this scenario: no priorities, uni-dimensional fairness, and multi-dimensional
fairness methods (WOC, LS, BBWOC and BBLS). On the one hand, Figure 3
points that the use of priorities changes the costs of the service allocation.
It can be seen that, generally, when using priorities, service agents have not
needed to increase their expenditure to allocate resources. The only case
when an agent had to spent more money to externalize a task when using
a priority has been with SA2: when using the LS method SA2 had to pay
an average of 34,365.75 euros per simulation whilst when no priority was
used it paid 31,652.89. In the rest of cases the agents expenditure when
using priority methods has been lower than when no priority has been used.
These results are the expected ones in a fairness mechanism which pursues
to maintain agents interested in the auction, and then, more agents means
more competitive prices.
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Figure 3: Service agents (auctioneers) mean expenditure at the end of simulations. No
priority (dark blue), uni-dimensional priority (orange), LS (red), WOC (green), BBLS
(purple), BBWOC (clear blue).
On the other hand, regarding the benefits of the resource providers (Fig-
ure 3), it can be seen that the use of priorities considerably changes the dis-
tribution of the revenues: the differences between agents revenue has been
reduced when including fairness into the mechanism as expected. Another
remarkable fact is that bidders which obtained poor revenues (e.g. SP1, 5
and 6) increase their benefits. However it is also important to notice that
the inclusion of fairness into the mechanism has modified the ranking of
the richest service providers (e.g. RP4 is the second richest agent when no
fairness mechanism is applied whilst using a bid-based fairness mechanism
makes him the fourth richest agent). This result is further analyzed in the
next experimental scenario.
To deepen on the analysis of fairness in the allocations, Figure 5 presents
a box plot of the Gini’s index [8] corresponding to the 200 executions of
the scenario. It is important to notice that the differences between agents
revenue are conditioned by the skills. In this sense, we can see that the four
poorest agents (RP1, RP3, RP5 and RP6) are the ones with less skills and
it is reasonable to assume that other agents with better skills will have the
chance to perform more tasks. This fact is taken into account in the fairness
analysis performed: in the computation of the Gini’s index each resource
provider is weighted according to the number of skills (population) it is able
to perform.
Results obtained clearly show that the use of priorities lowers the in-
equality coefficient: when no priority is used the index has an average of
23
Figure 4: Resource providers (bidders) mean revenue at the end of simulations. From
left to right: No priority (dark blue), uni-dimensional priority (orange), LS (red), WOC
(green), BBLS (purple), BBWOC (clear blue).
0.3623 whilst the use of priorities results in indexes lower than 0.3078 (with
the BBLS). The lowest inequality index is obtained with the uni-dimensional
priority (0.2134), followed by the BBWOC (0.2262) and the WOC (0.2371).
The variance of the results does not allow us to determine which is the best
priority method between those three (2-sample T tests do not point signif-
icant differences between the results), however, it can be clearly seen that
including a priority into the auction improves the equity of the resulting allo-
cation. Since revenue only takes into account the first attribute of the bids,
it is reasonable that the uni-dimensional priority obtained the best Gini’s
index. However, if we also take into account another attribute (time), results
show a different face.
Figure 6 shows the mean number of delays produced during the simula-
tions when using different types of priorities. In this Figure, is it possible to
observe that the uni-dimensional priority produces the highest mean number
of delays, due to the fact that the uni-dimensional priority is only concerned
by the cost attribute, pointing the need of applying fairness in a multidimen-
sional way. When using multidimensional fairness, delays are significantly
reduced, as shown in the box-plots. Using Student’s t-test with a 95% of
confidence we can say that, inside the multidimensional priority methods,
the LS is the worst of them and the WOC the second worst. Regarding the
WOC and the BB-WOC, the test does not points significant differences be-
tween them. It can be seen that when using qualitative methods the number
of delays produced (7.242 and 8.003 time units) is similar to when no priority
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Figure 5: Resource agents’ Gini’s index for the resulting allocations in terms of revenue:
1. No priority 2. Loosing Streak 3. Won coefficient 4. Bid-based WOC 5. Bid-based LS
6. Unidimensional.
is used. This is caused by the fact that bidders which offer almost-winning
bids obtain high priority faster than low-quality bidders, in this way, weaker
bidders still obtain advantage after a long period losing without jeopardizing
the quality of the allocations.
In the boxplot of Figure 6, it is possible to observe that when no priority
is used the number of delays produced is also low (7.911). This is due the
fact that the auction mechanism chooses the bids which minimize cost and
execution time without taking into account priorities. However, the results
obtained are worse than the BBWOC method (7.424), and very close to the
BBLS method (8.003). If the Gini’s index (Figure 5) is put together with
the delay results (Figure 6), we can conclude that multidimensional fairness
is providing at the long run the better allocation outcomes than no priorities
and uni-dimensional approaches; and particular, the BBWOC qualitative
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Figure 6: Delays produced: 1. No priority 2. Loosing Streak 3. Won coefficient 4.
Bid-based WOC 5. Bid-based LS 6. Unidimensional.
methods is the best.
Summarizing the results of scenario 1, we can conclude that the use of
multidimensional priorities can improve the fairness of the task allocation by
assigning some services to the weaker agents without increasing the global
cost of the allocation nor incurring in significant delays; however by using
this methodologies, some of the strongest bidders may experience envy as
their incomes could be reduced for the sake of equity.
5.2.2. Results on scenario 2:
This scenario focus the discussion on the wealth rank disorder stated in
the previous scenario. For this end, we use the WRM measure defined above
(Equation 12) which is based on the the number of positions in the wealth
rank that each agents wins or loses due to the fairness mechanism.
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Figure 7: Mean Gini Index (blue circles) and mean WRM (green triangles) for the stochas-
tic priority methods when using WOC (top left), LS (top right), BBWOC (bottom right)
and BBLS (bottom left).
As stated in the scenario description, simulation consists on varying the
upj parameter from 0.0 to 1.0 (from changing the priority always according
to the priority method, to never changing the priority). It is reasonable to
expect that results when upj is 0.0 will be similar to the results of the previous
scenario when no priority is used and that when upj = 1.0 results will be
similar to the ones obtained in the previous scenario with WOC,BBWOC,LS
and BBLS. Respect the WRM, ranking disorders are expected to increase as
priorities are more often used (the higher the upj, the higher WRM).
Figure 7 shows the results obtained in terms of the Gini’s index and the
WRM with the probabilstic versions of WOC,BBWOC,LS and BBLS. As
expected, in all cases, the resulting allocation is fairer as the higher upj is
because, as commented before, when upj = 1 the method behaves in a deter-
ministic way. When analyzing revenue of the agents, we can see how Gini’s
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index progressively varies from an initial value (common to all the meth-
ods) situated around 0.36 when up = 0.0 to different values conditioned by
the priority calculation when up = 1.0. In all the cases the mean Gini’s
index obtained when up = 1 (probWOC=0.2379, probBBWOC=0.2217,
probLS=0.2688 and probBBLS=0.3092) are very similar to the values ob-
tained in the previous scenario, confirming that the stochastic methods with
up = 1 are equivalent to the deterministic approaches.
On the other hand, focusing in the wealth rank disorder which the pre-
sented fairness mechanisms may produce, Figure 7 clearly shows that fairness
and rank preservation are clearly related: the higher the fairness, the higher
the disorder. In all the cases, it can be clearly seen that being fairer implies
changing the wealth ranking, and this can cause some complaints or dissatis-
faction among bidders who lose some positions in the ranking. Consequently
to that, it can also be seen that probBBWOC (with the best fairness) it
is also the method with the highest WRM (0.3489) followed by probWOC
(WRM=0.3092), probLS (0.2973) and probBBLS (0.2901).
Regarding the compromise between fairness and rank preservation, it can
be seen that the probWOC and probBBWOC methods with upj = 0.7 and
0.8 may present the best solution since they obtain best fairness than probLS
and probBBLS but with a lower rank modification. Concordantly to this fact,
probWOC and probBBWOC are also the priority methods where the WRM
curve and Gini’s index curves cross at a lowest up (around up = 0.85) whilst
in probLS it crosses around 0.95. Finally, in the probBBLS the two curves
never cross.
To sum up, the stochastic priority methods proposed offer the chance to
reduce the alteration of the wealth rank provoked by the priority, especially
in the case of probWOC and probBBWOC. However, not silver bullet can
be provided and the analyzed methods must be configured according to the
mechanism designer needs, by tuning the upj parameter that best suits to
each problem.
5.2.3. Results on scenario 3:
This last scenario analyzes how the use of priorities affects the bidder drop
problem, the problem which auction mechanisms must face. Another related
problem we analyze is the asymmetric balance of negotiation power between
auctioneers and bidders caused by the progressive desertion of agents, de-
creasing the competitiveness of the market. For that purpose the number of
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Figure 8: Active bidders in the market during a simulation where half of the agents (25)
try to manipulate the auction working under their production cost and where the other
half are adaptative.
participants which take part in the auction market among time and the task
mean cost are used as metrics.
Figure 8 shows the number of active bidders which are inside the auction
market along time when using different priority strategies and Figure 9 show a
boxplot of the mean active agents after the simulations. The first interesting
result is that priority methods maintain a higher number of agents interested
in the market than a mechanism without priorities. In the non-priority case,
the chart shows how the number of participants drastically drops from 50 to
20.09, with all the adaptive agents left out (in this case all the adaptative
bidders and even some cheater bidders are forced to leave the auction due
to the greedy behavior of the most powerful cheater agents). This descent
is minimized when priorities are included in the auction mechanism. If we
compare this result with an ideal case where all the bidders act honestly and
no bidder leaves the market, it means that only the 40% of the bidders are
maintained within the auction.
In Figure 8 it can be also observed that between the twentieth time cycle
and the 70th, using any of the proposed priority methods, there is a reduc-
tion on the participation. This fact is produced by the 25 agents which start
underbidding in order to collapse the market and create an oligopoly. How-
ever, the influence of these bidders is lower depending on the kind of priority
method used.
The chart shows that the BBWOC(clear blue), the LS (black) and the
WOC (grey) are the priority methods which best preserve the number of
active bidders inside the auction (between 34 and 35 active bidders, which
corresponds to the 68% and 70% of bidders of the ideal scenario). In these
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Figure 9: Box plot showing the number of
active bidders after the simulations when
no priority is used and when using different
methods of calculating the priority.
Figure 10: Box plot showing the mean cost
of a workflow allocation after the simula-
tions when no priority is used and when
using different methods of calculating the
priority.
cases, priority has increased the chances of winning of the adaptive agents,
keeping their interest in the auctions and avoiding the creation of an oligopoly
by the side of the underbidding agents.
The probBBWOC priority calculation method and the BBLS priority
do not appear to be as effective to preserve the number of active bidders:
30(60%) and 25 (50%) respectively. In the first case this fact is probably
produced by the lower influence of the priority. In the second, the lower
number of active bidders is caused by the way priorities are assigned, based
on the bid fitness. As underbidding agents start offering better bids, in spite
that they do not win, their bids have high fitness and, therefore, they obtain
higher priorities than adaptative agents. In consequence, the chances of many
adaptive agents to win an auction during the first part of the simulations
decrease, and they leave the auction after the given losing streak.
Regarding the asymmetric balance of negotiation power, it can be mea-
sured through the value of the mean cost of a task allocation. Figure 10
clearly points that the allocation costs are reduced when priorities are used.
When no priority is used the mean allocation costs rises to an average of
72.65 per task; however, when a priority method is used the mean cost is
significantly reduced up to 56.44 (a 22.65% cheaper). Taking into account
this boxplot and the one in Figure 9 we can say that, under certain circum-
stances, the use of our priority methods can prevent and difficult the bidder
agents to fix the market price.
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Figure 11: Mean task cost after a simulation where half of the agents try to manipulate the
auction working under their production cost and where the other half adopt an adaptative
strategy.
To deepen on the results regarding the asymmetric balance of negotiation
power, Figure 11 shows the evolution of the mean task costs during the
simulation. The red line indicates the mean task cost which a task would
have had in the ideal case where all the bidders of the mechanism had bid
truthfully (55 per task). The first remarkable fact which can be observed
in the chart is that, independently from the priority method used, there is
an initial drop of prices. This descent is caused by the underbidding agents
which pretend to exclude the rest of bidders. After this initial gap it can be
seen how the mean cost of the allocations increases progressively. However,
the roof of this increase is different for each priority used. On the one hand,
when no priority is used, as there are no adaptative bidders remaining in
the market, the underbidding bidders can arise the price as much as they
want (72.65, a 33.09% higher than the true values) because they have more
power to fix the market price. On the other hand, this increment is lower
when priorities are used. The BBWOC is the type of priority which obtains
the mean cost per task most similar to the one fixed by bidder’s true value
(56.93 against 55, only a 3.51% more expensive), very close to the ideal
situation. The rest of priority methods obtain higher mean price per task
(between 57.97 and 62.48) being the WOC the second lowest mean price
and the BBLS method the worst. It is important to notice that the two
methods which obtained the best performance are both based on the won
auction coefficient. The supremacy of WOC versus LS methods is due to
the fact that losing streak methods favours agents which have not won in
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the last auctions, in consequence, when the underbidding bidders have a big
losing streak they may benefit of the priority. Conversely, the auction won
coefficient takes into account all the victories agents have obtained along
time. Thus, underbidding agents are ballasted since they have won almost
all the auctions at the beginning of the simulation, having fewer chances to
win the rest of the auctions.
In summary, this experiment has shown that the use of priorities can
reduce the effects of the bidder drop problem, minimizing the effects of the
unbalance power of negotiation between auctioneers and bidders. The fact
the number of bidders leaving the market is reduced also minimizes the asym-
metric balance of negotiation bower between bidders and auctioneers as hav-
ing a high number of active bidders prevents the formation of an oligopoly
which fixes the price of the market (as happens when no priority is used).
5.2.4. Summary
Our experiments pointed that in multi-attribute auctions priority must be
computed taking into account all the attributes involved in the auction, oth-
erwise, the quality of the allocation may be compromised. In our approach,
being the winner or the loser of an auction means to take into account all
of the attributes involved in the auction. This was clearly observed when a
uni-attribute priority was used: unlike the multidimensional priority meth-
ods which obtained fair allocations without increasing the number of delays,
the unidimensional priority obtained slightly fairer allocations but jeopardiz-
ing the quality of the allocations since the number of delays has increased 6
times.
On the other hand results show that improving the fairness of an allo-
cation can alter the wealth distribution among agents and may annoy the
richest agents. The stochastic methods proposed in Section 4.4 can soften the
this alteration without compromising to much the fairness of the allocation.
The experiments suggest that the best compromise between a fair allocation
and wealth rank preservation is achieved when using the probBBWOC with
a up of 0.7.
Finally, experiments showed that the use of a priority within the auction
process can reduce the bidder drop problem and prevent the creation of
oligopolies which can fix the market prices. This fact combined with the
results of the first experiments make the use of multi-dimensional priorities
an interesting tool for those mechanism designers which want to take into
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account the equity of allocations in the long run in multi-attribute auction
domains.
Note that, if we assume that agents cannot change their identity, using
this kind of priorities an agent can enter the market and leave it whenever
it wants since the measures are calculated using all the auctions which each
auctioneer have summoned. In other words, if an agent leaves the market
and, after a while, reenters to it, the agent will maintain the priority it
had when it left since it will have the same track of won and participated
auctions. Additionally, an agent which just entered the market is treated in
the same way that the rest of the participants, the only particularity of this
case is that its participated and won auction record will be empty (this fact
will have more or less relevance according to the method used to calculate
the priority). Nevetheless, future research should take into account dynamic
scnearios.
6. Conclusions
Fairness mechanisms for multi-attribute resource allocation problems,
from a multi-dimensional perspective, need to take into account all the at-
tributes which affect the allocation since focusing fairness only on the rev-
enues of the participants may compromise the quality of the rest of the at-
tributes involved in the decision process (e.g. delays in deliveries, alterations
in energy consumptions, etc.).
In this paper we propose a multidimencional fairness approach for auction-
based multi attribute resource allocation which faces the problem in a more
holonic way, taking into account priorities along all the auction process (in
the winner determination problem but also in the payment mechanism steps).
The proposed approach assigns higher priorities to the bidders which are sus-
ceptible to leave the auction market due to their bad results in previous auc-
tions, in this way, agents which have a high probability of leaving the market
have higher chances of winning an auction, thereby obtaining an incentive to
remain in the market.
We presented a collection of eight methods for computing the priority of
the agents based on the ratio of auctions they win and lose or their losing
streaks. Two of the methods are designed under a quantitative schema (ab-
solute values regarding auctions won or lost) whilst two others are designed
under a qualitative schema (giving higher priorities to those bidders which
offered good bids but lost the auction); furthermore, an stochastic version
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of these four methods is also provided. The stochastic approaches proposed
allow to tune the consequences of the priority methods regarding the wealth
ranking disorder.
The performed experiments, based on real data extracted from a man-
ufacturing company, point that the inclusion of multi-dimensional priorities
improves the fairness of the resulting allocations (measured using the Gini’s
index) whilst not compromising the rest of attributes involved in the alloca-
tion. The best results have been obtained by the methods which compute the
priorities using a ratio of won and participated auction both in the quanti-
tative (WOC) and qualitative (BBWOC) versions. The allocations of WOC
and BBWOC were slightly less fair in terms of revenue than when using
a uni-dimensional fairness method, however the multi-dimensional fairness
priorities clearly outperformed the results of uni-dimensional priorities when
analyzing the rest of attributes. Experiments also suggested that wealthi-
est agents may feel uncomfortable with the obtained allocations due to an
hegemony loss. This problem is minimized when using the stochastic pri-
ority calculation methods as it allows to adjust the influence of priorities,
achieving a fair distribution without altering so much the hegemony of rich-
est agents. Finally, the results also showed that the use of priorities can
reduce the bidder drop problem and showed that preserving a high number
of bidders prevents the strongest agents to fix the market price.
Further research should concern problems that may arise due to use of
false identities by bidders, a common problem within fairness literature [16].
Moreover, despite in this work we have studied some issues realted to un-
derbidding agents, further research should be conducted regarding incentive
compatibility in the long run.
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